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ABSTRACT 
The European Union (EU) has been hailed as the most successful model of regional integration thus far, 
while the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), despite its fair share of critics and 
doomsayers, has been seen as a relatively successful regional organisation in the developing world. 
However, both seemed to have arrived at a critical juncture in their respective regional projects. 
Challenged by recent events, internal and external, and faced with increasing uncertainties and 
complexities, the EU and ASEAN are forced to re-examine the journey they have taken so far and 
ponder the road ahead. 
 
This paper seeks first to provide an overview of the two parallel processes of regionalism in Europe and 
Southeast Asia by focusing on the developments of the EU and ASEAN, and dissecting both the external 
forces and internal dynamics that shape the respective regional processes. It then sketches out some of 
the global trends likely to impact regional developments in Europe and Asia, and questions if the EU 
and ASEAN would need a new regional approach or paradigm if they are to maintain their salience and 
relevance as regional actors. 
Left: Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the 
European Commission; right: H.E Le Luong 
Minh, Secretary-General of ASEAN. 
(Photos: European Union; ASEAN, 2013)  
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THE EU AND ASEAN – IN SEARCH OF 
A NEW REGIONAL PARADIGM? 
 
YEO LAY HWEE 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The 1990s saw a wave of optimism with regard to 
international cooperation and international institutions. 
It also ushered in a new wave of regionalism – with the 
founding of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) forum, the creation of the North American Free 
Trade Area (NAFTA) and Mercosur (Mercato Comun del 
Sur – Southern Common Market). Regionalism was 
seen as an inevitable response to globalisation, an 
increasingly important level between the national and 
global in the context of a multilevel global governance 
structure. 
 
The European Union (EU) has long been held up as a 
model of regional integration, and the study of 
regionalism and regional integration has been very 
much influenced by the developments in Europe from 
the founding of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) to the European Economic 
Community and the transformation into the European 
Union. 
 
This euro-centric approach, however, has been 
challenged with the rise of the idea of open regionalism 
which emerged in the 1980s and, in particular, with the 
increase in interest on developments in the Asia-Pacific 
with the launch of APEC, and the emergence of 
“regionalist scholarship” revolving around the study of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 
regionalism in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific.   
 
The regionalist impulses and the regionalisms of the EU 
and ASEAN must be understood within its historical 
context resulting in different trajectories. While 
European integration was driven by the memories of its 
bloody past and the need to “contain” nationalism to 
prevent another war, ASEAN was driven by the concern 
over potential future conflicts in a very volatile region 
that it was in. In short, one could say the EU was driven 
more by history and ASEAN more by geography. The 
predominant impulse in the EU was to prevent another 
war and to reconstruct and rebuild, while that of 
ASEAN was to try and maintain a balance of power and 
a semblance of stability in its region so that attention 
can be focused on building “national resilience”. The 
peace and reconciliation imperative led Europe towards 
a remarkable step in creating the ECSC with pooled 
sovereignty in the management of coal and steel, while 
the need to maintain some order and stability in 
Southeast Asia produced an ASEAN that focused on 
confidence building and emphasis on non-interference.  
 
Despite the different origins and raison d’etre of the 
two regional entities, in the post-Cold war world with 
the spread of the neo-liberalist idea of globalisation, 
there was a palpable sense that regionalisms would 
converge along the trajectory of further 
institutionalisation and legalism, and hence ASEAN 
should become more like the EU. However, recent 
events in Europe and Asia have created uncertainties 
with regard to the future developments of the EU and 
ASEAN. 
 
This paper is an attempt to tease out the future 
trajectory of regionalism in the EU and ASEAN by 
looking at how global trends and the dynamic 
interaction of the forces of politics, economics and 
technology would impact regional developments within 
Europe and Asia. The paper begins with a quick 
overview of the integration processes of the EU and the 
more informal character of regionalism that has 
developed within ASEAN.  It then sketches out some of 
the global trends and asks if the EU and ASEAN would 
need a new narrative or a new approach in response to 
the changes within their respective regions in order to 
maintain their salience and relevance to its member 
states.   
 
 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION, EU STYLE 
 
The European integration project started in the 1950s 
and has since gone through five major changes of the 
treaties to adjust to new circumstances. With each 
treaty change, integration has deepened. The 
uniqueness of the European integration project vis-à-vis 
other regional projects such as ASEAN or ASEAN Plus 
Three lies in its blend of inter-governmentalism and 
supranationalism underpin by principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality. While many regional projects are 
purely inter-governmental in its organisation, the EU 
has a web of institutions, and a framework of rules and 
procedures that support supranationalism. 
 
Supranational elements of the EU are manifested by 
the pooling and delegation of sovereignty. What this 
meant in practice is that member states have pooled 
and transferred a limited number of competences in 
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certain policy areas on a permanent basis to the 
European institutions. In these areas, member states 
act collectively (and not independently). Once decisions 
are taken collectively (usually through Qualified 
Majority Voting), member states are obliged to 
implement these decisions. 
 
The nature of European integration has also changed 
over time – from being seen essentially as a peace 
project bringing about the reconciliation of France and 
Germany, to an instrument for economic cooperation, 
and now an entity that is designed not only to manage 
economic interdependence and the challenges of 
globalisation, but a regional actor trying to shape the 
external conditions through a web of regional 
governance structures. The need for regional agency 
comes from the challenges of globalisation as most 
states are too weak to manage these problems on their 
own.    
 
New areas of policies are taken up at the European 
level on the assumption that common efforts will be 
more effective than individual national efforts. The EU 
has even implemented a large number of common 
policies under the broad remit of human security, 
ranging from immigration, counter-terrorism and police 
cooperation, which was beyond the purview of the EU 
two decades ago. At the same time however, in its 
endeavours to revitalise the European economies, 
member states were not willing to abandon national 
efforts with regard to policies on research, innovation 
and technology, seen as crucial drivers to turn the EU 
into the most competitive economic region. 
 
The attempt to draft a Constitution in 2002-4 in 
response to the enlargement and the subsequent 
rejection of this Constitution by key founding members 
(France and the Netherlands) of the EU brought about 
heated debates – where the EU should go from here?  
How far and how deep?   
 
The Reform Treaty (Lisbon Treaty), taking off from 
where the Constitution failed, contains a number of 
provisions marking how far integration should go, and 
conveys the message that there is a need for a pause of 
some length to ponder the necessity and desirability of 
further integration. The fact of the matter is that 
integration in whatever form will work if it proves itself 
by adding value to what nation states can do alone. 
This fundamental fact needs to be borne in mind as the 
EU debates its future. What kind of structural reforms 
are needed so that the EU can be of added value to its 
member states in solving the problems the latter face 
but cannot solve alone?  And how can the EU get its 
citizens to look upon the EU institutions as theirs in the 
same way they look upon their national systems – with 
the requisite legitimacy, transparency and 
accountability? 
 
The Lisbon Treaty introduced various changes in an 
attempt to address precisely these issues of legitimacy, 
transparency and accountability.   
 
On the official website of the European Union, the 
Lisbon Treaty (Reform Treaty) is being described as 
providing the Union with “the legal framework and 
tools necessary to meet future challenges and to 
respond to citizens’ demands”. The changes contained 
in the Lisbon Treaty such as enhancing the legislative 
power of the European Parliament, a greater role for 
the national parliaments and the citizens’ rights to 
initiate policy reforms are supposed to make the Union 
more democratic and transparent. Other changes such 
as providing the Union a legal personality, creation of 
two new positions – that of an appointed President of 
the European Council for a fixed period of time, and the 
double-hatted High Representative for the Union in 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy supported by a new 
European External Action Service – are supposed to 
provide the frameworks and tools necessary to make 
EU a coherent actor on the world stage, and to protect 
and promote the Union’s values.  
 
While the Treaty does not fundamentally change the 
EU’s institutional set-up, it contains new elements such 
as the provision for clearer division of power and 
competences, new voting methods, and the extension 
of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to more policy 
areas, all of which are supposed to make the Union 
more efficient and effective. At the same time, it also 
contains numerous safeguard mechanisms to limit a 
further erosion of the member states’ control over 
what is decided in terms of new European legislation or 
budgetary commitments. The QMV, while extended to 
many more areas, is also provided with mutual blocking 
mechanisms and “emergency brakes”, and national 
parliaments are given the possibility to object to new 
legislation in order to prevent a further erosion of 
national competences to the EU level. The principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality were also reaffirmed in 
the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty reflects the desire to balance 
demands for democratic control and legitimacy versus 
efficiency and effectiveness. The governance of the EU 
hence reflects both characteristics of hierarchical, top-
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down control exercise by supranational institutions, 
and at the same time, it is increasingly open to 
“political competition with member states trying to 
regain initiatives on policies” (Borsel, 2010: 191). The 
Union has to balance the powers and clarify the 
competence of its institutions and at the same time 
accommodate the increasing range of national interests 
as membership expands. 
 
This competition is one of the dilemmas of European 
governance, and has begun to take its toll on decision-
making during crisis, as reflected in the EU handling of 
the debt crisis that began with the debacle in Greece at 
the end of 2009. The euro zone crisis raises awkward 
questions about the design of the system of 
governance for the EU as a whole, and specifically for 
the euro zone. The crisis may be seen to have relegated 
the European Parliament and the European 
Commission – the two main supranational institutions 
of the EU – to a secondary role, while reinforcing the 
role of the European Council, the main inter-
governmental entity. However, while the economic 
crisis may seem to have given more power to the EU 
member states, the close involvement of the European 
Central Bank (ECB), and the decisions taken by it which 
is supposed to be independent, also demonstrated that 
supranational institutions cannot be excluded from the 
decision-making process (Pardo, 2012: 86). 
 
However, beyond the institutional wrangling and 
decision-making process, the seeming inability of the 
EU to come to grips with its problem to address the 
financial crisis in a decisive manner has also put a dent 
on the European integration process, long seen as a 
relatively successful model of region-building.   
 
 
REGIONALISM THE ASEAN WAY 
 
ASEAN began as a project to promote confidence 
building among its founding members, and at the same 
time for them to band together to present a united 
front against potential external interference from 
outside powers. Security concern was the major driver 
towards loose and informal cooperation among its 
members.  
 
The progress of ASEAN in its formative years was very 
slow, occasionally marred by residual disputes fuelled 
by continued mistrust among the members. However, 
major political developments in the region and 
internationally, such as the accelerated withdrawal of 
British forces east of Suez, Nixon’s Guam doctrine in 
1969 in the face of setbacks in Vietnam, with security 
implications for the region, kept the members together. 
The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia (then 
Kampuchea) in 1978 led to a more concerted effort by 
the ASEAN members to work together and coordinate 
their positions in international forums leading to the 
emergence of ASEAN as a diplomatic community. 
 
External factors played an important part in ASEAN’s 
development. The Vietnamese withdrawal from 
Cambodia and the end of the Cold war challenged 
ASEAN to embark on a more ambitious agenda to 
promote the ASEAN Way as the modus operandi for 
managing security relations in the broader Asia-Pacific. 
The ASEAN Way is built on the distinctive approach of 
quiet diplomacy conducted through informal 
mechanisms with emphasis on consultation and 
consensus. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) emerged 
in 1994 as the very first security forum in the Asia-
Pacific that brings together all the major powers to 
dialogue on political and security issues.  
 
The Asian financial crisis that hit Southeast Asia in 1997 
brought serious challenges to ASEAN and its ASEAN 
Way. The loss of economic competitiveness to other 
emerging markets, in particular China, and the need to 
revitalise its economic fortunes and strengthen 
coordination in response to globalisation led to calls 
towards deeper economic integration. The rise of China 
and its increasing presence in the Asia-Pacific led to 
complex issues and linkages between economic and 
security regionalism. The formal separation of the two 
spheres cannot hide the extent to which political 
bargaining is structured by the relationship between 
trade and economic agenda on the one hand, and the 
looming uncertainties in the security sphere. This in 
turn drove ASEAN to progressively move away from 
loose inter-governmental cooperation towards far 
more explicit security activism, in the form of the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministers 
Meeting Plus 8 (ADMM Plus) and the East Asia Summit, 
and intensification of economic cooperation within 
ASEAN, culminating in the call for the creation of an 
ASEAN Community by the year 2015.  
 
The need to deepen economic integration to make 
ASEAN a market of 600 million consumers – that would 
be attractive for investors – brought with it the 
narrative of greater institutionalisation and of moving 
towards a rules-based ASEAN. The ASEAN Charter was 
signed in 2007 and came into force in 2008. A more 
integrated and cohesive ASEAN is also seen as 
necessary if ASEAN is to maintain its centrality as the 
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driving force in its relations with external partners in 
the various regional architectures. 
 
The external environment of ASEAN has grown much 
more complex compared to the Cold War era. Internally, 
with ASEAN’s enlargement to include Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, the diversities that are 
already a hallmark of ASEAN have further multiplied.   
 
The most serious challenge to ASEAN’s international 
standing since the Cold War has been its inclusion of 
Myanmar as a member (Jones, 2012:180). The situation 
in Myanmar worsened in 2007 with the violent 
crackdown of the protests by the monks, and the 
humanitarian disaster unleashed by Cyclone Nargis in 
2008. The internal politics of Thailand wreaked further 
havoc to the unity of ASEAN, as political parties in 
Thailand tried to shore up their “nationalistic 
credentials” by picking on the unresolved disputes with 
Cambodia over the sovereignty of the area surrounding 
the Preah Vihar temple. The cancellation of one of the 
ASEAN Summits in Thailand in 2008 due to clashes 
between opposing political groups, and the border 
skirmishes between Thailand and Cambodia that 
erupted in 2010 and went on for almost a year, 
shattered the carefully restored image of ASEAN in the 
years leading to the drafting of the ASEAN Charter. 
ASEAN was again seen to be faltering, unable to deliver 
on the “political and strategic coherence required for 
the unity of will and purpose necessary for it to be an 
effective actor in the regional international order” 
(Weatherbee, 2012: 3).  
 
This show of disunity and lack of leadership in ASEAN 
came at a time when the strategic and economic 
environment of the Asia-Pacific was undergoing major 
shifts in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 
2008-9.  A faltering, distracted ASEAN led to the 
increasing assertiveness of China in the South China Sea, 
and rising tensions between China and the claimant 
states in Southeast Asia.  
 
It was also during this laggard period of ASEAN that 
external partners began to question the effectiveness 
of “ASEAN-centred” regional architectures, and led to 
calls for new architectures such as the concert of 
powers idea of Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, 
and an exclusive East Asia community – similar to the 
European Community – by Japanese Prime Minister 
Hatoyama. The rising tensions between the two key 
powers, the US and China, and the pivot of the US 
towards Asia eclipsed ASEAN’s “claim to centrality in 
the Asian regionalism” (Weatherbee, 2012: 5). These 
challenges to ASEAN’s centrality were partly answered 
by Indonesia’s skillful chairmanship of ASEAN in 2011, 
injecting a sense of urgency towards community 
building and promoting an activist agenda for ASEAN.  
However, whether ASEAN can continue to lay claim to 
its centrality is uncertain, and ASEAN’s unity and hence 
centrality was tested again in July 2012, when ASEAN 
failed to issue (for the first time in history) a joint 
communiqué at the conclusion of its 45th Foreign 
Ministers Meeting, due to internal differences over 
how to handle the South China Sea issue. 
 
ASEAN has no doubt helped to create “a minimalist 
normative bargain among the great powers in the 
region” through various ASEAN-led regional 
frameworks (Goh, 2011: 373).  ASEAN’s comparative 
advantage is that it is universally acceptable as the 
driver of regionalism in a situation in which the great 
powers are suspicious of each other. ASEAN currently 
occupies a central role in the Asia-Pacific, particularly in 
East Asia, because of “the unique qualities of the East 
Asian environment in which ASEAN operates” (Narine, 
2009: 370). The major powers in East Asia, Japan and 
China do not trust each other because of historical 
reasons and because of on-going tensions over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. The Asia-
Pacific also constitutes a “unique security environment” 
with major powers (the US, China, Japan and, to some 
extent, Russia and India) competing with one another 
for influence. These rivalries have created “a political 
space within which ASEAN may exercise significant 
regional influence” and enhance its own strategic 
importance. However, whether ASEAN can “exploit this 
advantage is partly contingent on the organisation’s 
internal unity” (Narine, 2009: 370).    
 
So far, ASEAN has been able to maintain a central role 
in the various regional architectures by default because 
the major powers in the region have abstained from 
leadership for fear of arousing suspicion from their 
rivals. However, as the US and China step up their 
competition in the region more openly, ASEAN has to 
move from “centrality of goodwill” to “centrality of 
substance”. This means that ASEAN has to increase its 
political and economic weight by building a successful 
ASEAN Community, and at the same time enhance its 
external relations with all major powers to show its 
ability to continue to drive the various regional 
architectures. Otherwise, it would find itself being 
increasingly challenged and undermined.  
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GLOBAL TRENDS AND REGIONAL RESPONSES?  
 
The challenges that are faced by the EU and ASEAN are 
different in many ways, but at the same time, many of 
these challenges are compounded by various global 
trends and dynamics that all nation-states and regions 
face. This brings us to consider the importance of the 
external, the global and the systemic in thinking about 
regionalism, and reinforces the central point on the 
links between the external and internal logic and 
impulses in determining the future of regional entities 
such as the EU and ASEAN. 
 
Growing Nationalism and Populism 
 
In an article published in “World Future Review”, 
futurist and former Danish diplomat Jørgen Ørstrøm 
Møller described “nationalism, populism and 
inequality” as the “deadly cocktail” that would lead us 
to a highly turbulent transition to a future post-
industrial political system.  
 
Indeed, nationalism and populism seem to be growing 
in many countries and Europe has not been spared. 
Despite decades of building the European Union, the 
crisis had led to increasing economic uncertainties 
which in turn fuelled growing resentment towards 
foreigners who are perceived to be responsible for their 
problems – for instance, that the Chinese are taking 
away jobs from Europe, and so on. People “seek refuge 
in nationalism blaming foreigners for the various 
problems they encounter in daily life” (Møller, 2011: 21) 
and all over Europe, one has seen the rise in support of 
populist right-wing parties that promise to tighten 
immigration, and bring jobs back through economic 
nationalism. 
 
The principle of solidarity that is fundamental to the 
creation of a genuine community has also been eroded 
during the crisis, and, in particular, in the imposition of 
austerity on EU member states seeking bailout because 
of the debt crisis. Blame games and name-calling have 
reinforced national stereotypes. It was therefore not 
surprising that the latest survey by Pew Research 
Center support for economic integration in the EU 
showed downward trends and positive view of the EU 
are at or near their low point in more EU nations.1  
 
In his article “Nationalism: The Communitarian Block”, 
Amitai Etzioni pointed out the difficulties experienced 
                                                     
1
 See the website of the Pew Research Center’s Global 
Attitudes Project, available online at: www.pewglobal.org  
by the EU in moving up to a higher level of community-
building because of growing nationalism. He noted that 
 
on the one hand, the EU needs to be able to 
overcome the nationalism that blocks progress 
on the communitarian march towards more 
encompassing social groupings – to parallel the 
need for more encompassing and effective 
transnational governance. On other hand, it 
seems unable to meet this challenge […] 
Without significant transfer of commitment and 
loyalty from the citizens of the member nations 
to the evolving supranational community – the 
EU will be unable to sustain the kind of 
encompassing state-like shared governance 
endeavour it attempts to advance [and will 
likely] retreat to being only a free trade zone 
enriched by numerous legal and administrative 
shared arrangements. 
 
Other analysts have also noted that the recent financial 
crisis have further pushed the EU towards more inter-
governmentalism. The power of member states has 
grown, “bringing back the asymmetries of size and 
weight as a structuring feature of political bargaining” 
in the EU (Janning, 2013). There is a palpable sense of 
creeping “renationalisation” of politics across the EU.  
European institutions and its politics “are on divergent 
paths…” and politics is moving “away from Brussels and 
back to the nation-state” (Kupchan, 2012:154). 
 
ASEAN has also not been spared the tide of rising 
nationalism. The rising tensions between China and 
Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are fuelled in 
part by rising nationalism in both countries. Right wing 
politicians in Japan and young people in China, fed by 
“nationalistic” education, have made it all the more 
harder for both governments to make sensible 
compromises and reach some sort of lasting resolution 
on these issues that are seen to impinge on sovereignty. 
 
While some would argue that it was precisely the 
mutual distrust and lack of reconciliation between 
Japan and China that provide ASEAN the space for 
manoeuvre and to play the role of driver in regional 
integration in East Asia, increasing rivalry and hostility 
does not bode well for regional stability. 
 
Nationalism and populism are impulses likely to work 
against further integration in both the EU and ASEAN. 
While the latter has always emphasised “national 
sovereignty” and never see the regional project as a 
way to constrain nationalism –   and hence one could 
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argue that nothing is new – the context is rather 
different in the 21st century with increasing 
interdependence. Nationalism could set back some of 
the market-driven integration within ASEAN, and 
impede further economic integration, making it harder 
for the ASEAN economies to maximise the economic 
potential to bring about the much needed socio-
economic development so crucial for the stability and 
legitimacy of the ASEAN governments.  
 
The Changing Distribution of Power and Forum 
Shopping 
 
The rise of emerging or re-emerging powers such as 
Brazil, Russia, India and China, particularly in economic 
terms, has led to the changing distribution of global 
power. Initially, the redistribution of power was 
welcomed as the shift from a unipolar to a multipolar 
world. Increasingly, however, this shift in global power 
distribution has been interpreted as either a move 
towards a “no one’s world” (Kupchan, 2012) or a 
“polycentric world” (ESPAS Report, 2012) in which no 
single country will be in a hegemonic position. Ian 
Bremmer went further to describe the current world 
order as a G-Zero world in which no single country or 
durable alliance of countries can meet the challenges of 
global leadership (Bremmer, 2012).  
 
While one may not exactly agree that we are in a G-
Zero world, the “rise of the rest” have indeed led to 
increasing challenge to existing institutions. Existing 
international institutions and multilateral forums are 
viewed with some suspicion by emerging and re-
emerging powers such as China, Russia, and India as 
“Western attempts of institutional power projections”.  
Increasingly, thus, some of these emerging powers are 
beginning to challenge these international institutions 
over issues such as membership and representation; 
decision-making procedures; and their normative order. 
These contestations lead to what Rüland termed 
“diminished multilateralism” that differs markedly from 
the “principled multilateralism” that liberal 
institutionalists and constructivists saw on the rise in 
the first half of the 1990s. Diminished multilateralism is 
devoid of the “cosmopolitan ideational underpinnings, 
the telos, legalism and contractualism characteristic of 
liberal conceptualisations of global governance” and 
instead is based on “low intensity cooperation that 
resonates more with realist paradigm such as power, 
balancing, hedging and relative-gains orientation” 
(Rüland, 2012: 258-9). 
 
The result of such contestations and challenges and the 
rise of diminished multilateralism is shallow, loosely 
institutionalised, contingent, informal, pragmatic and 
ad hoc multilateral cooperation. Often, the best that 
could be achieved are non-binding, imprecise 
agreements based on the lowest common denominator.    
 
Rüland further argued that the struggle over 
membership and representation, decision-making 
procedures and institutional norms would have 
repercussions on regional multilateralism: 
 
Both, the western beneficiaries of the current 
order as well as newly emerging powers have 
increasingly realised that influencing the power 
distribution in international institutions and 
negotiations on global policy issues necessitates 
bargaining power. Region building is one option 
of strengthening bargaining power. Emerging 
powers also strive for regional leadership 
because it bestows prestige on them […]  
 (Rüland, 2012: 258-9) 
 
Regional institutions inevitably also become 
instrumentalised devices for institutional power-
balancing rather than collective problem solving. 
 
Without a single hegemonic world power, a 
constellation of rising middle powers such as Indonesia, 
Turkey, South Africa will become ever more important, 
and the implications this has for regionalism is 
significant. According to the European Strategy and 
Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) 2012 report:  
 
The search for autonomy in a polycentric world 
and the proliferation of informal inter-state 
networks and groups may not be conducive to 
strengthen traditional regionalism. Some states 
will see regional integration as beneficial and as 
a platform to pursue their global ambitions, but 
others may invest energy in new non-
institutionalised trans-regional frameworks. 
This will make soft cooperation predominate 
and make deep integration (as undertaken in 
the EU) unlikely elsewhere.  
(ESPAS Report, 2012: 126) 
 
The report also said that: 
 
Regionalism will be a power multiplier for some 
such as Brazil and Indonesia, but not necessarily 
India or China. The international system that is 
likely to emerge as a result of all these shifts 
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will probably mix balance of power politics and 
multilateralism with states making issue-by-
issue shifts and alliances. This will generate a 
higher level of unpredictability in international 
relations and make it harder to attain a broad 
consensus even on matters requiring urgent 
global action. 
(ESPAS Report, 2012: 19) 
 
In short, the changing distribution of global power, 
leading to what Rüland called diminished 
multilateralism, would result in a certain loss of 
cooperative substance in both regional and 
international institutions. Many multilateral institutions 
are increasingly less able to initiate and organise 
collective action geared towards public goods, when 
energies are spent more on “institutional power games 
and forum shopping”. Forum shopping denotes a 
strategy by which actors “pick and choose among the 
mechanisms that best fit their individual political 
agenda” (Forman and Segaar 2006:213).  
 
Forum shopping has been endemic in Asia, and ASEAN 
has been adept in the game by not “ceding” its 
centrality in many of the emerging regional 
architectures. But ASEAN has been increasingly 
challenged by other powers participating in the various 
ASEAN-led or -created forums such as the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS). 
More insidious of course is that this trend will also 
begin to threaten the commitment of ASEAN member 
states towards ASEAN itself if key ASEAN members such 
as Indonesia and the Philippines engage actively in 
forum shopping and forming new alliances and 
frameworks to further their own agenda. 
 
Such a scenario is likely within ASEAN when some 
public intellectuals within Indonesia called for a post-
ASEAN policy – by which they mean that Indonesia 
should no longer place ASEAN at the centre of its 
foreign policy but should instead aim to be a global 
player and use the different forums in which it is a 
member of (such as G20 and the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference, for instance) to defend its national 
interest and project its influence.  
 
In the EU, forum shopping has an internal and external 
dimension. The enlargement of the EU has led to a 
proliferation of sub-regional cooperation schemes such 
as the Baltic Sea Cooperation Council, and the external 
dimension of the EU’s forum shopping is a string of so-
called strategic partnerships which the Union 
concluded with major powers such as US, China, Russia 
and India (Rüland, 2012:265-266).   
 
The Diffusion of State Power and Empowerment of 
Individuals 
 
The rapid developments and spread of communication 
technologies have led also to the diffusion of state 
power, and increasingly non-state actors and 
networked individuals empowered by social media can 
pose significant challenges to state actors. At a much 
more global scale, one sees the challenges to 
entrenched state powers as a result of the growth of 
the networked power. In his book The End of Power, 
Moises Naim argued that power is increasingly fleeting, 
and in fact “power is eroding – it is easier to get, but 
harder to use and far easier to lose”. 
 
This phenomenon is fuelled by three revolutions – the 
More revolution, the Mobility revolution and the 
Mentality revolution. The 21st century has more of 
everything, from people to literacy to products on the 
markets to political parties. An impatient and better 
informed middle class are demanding more from their 
governments, which the latter often cannot deliver fast 
enough. This coupled with the fact that people today 
not only are demanding more, but are also moving 
more than at any other time. That makes them harder 
to control. An ever-consuming and ever-moving 
population – with access to more resources and 
information than ever before – has also undergone a 
massive cognitive and emotional transformation, with 
increasing importance attached to individual freedom 
and choice. Naim argued that together, these three 
revolutions are eroding the barriers that have shielded 
the powerful from the challengers leading to the 
decline of traditional power. 
 
The decline of power, according to Naim, leads to 
political gridlock and to the inability to act together 
towards collection action to address many of the 
challenges we faced. Worse still, if the future of power 
lies in constant disruption and interference rather than 
management and consolidation, we would be entering 
a period of turbulence and instability. Transnational 
actors, civil society organisations, and networked 
activists are challenging governments and existing 
governance structures whether national, regional or 
global. 
 
In the midst of the pain and reforms forced by the 
euro-crisis, Lorenzo Fioramonti argued that we will be 
witnessing a “politicization of regions” where citizens 
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and civil society are rejecting the technocratic and elite-
driven, top-down integration and demanding more 
voice and power in determining the type of regional 
project they want to see. In response to the growing 
cost of integration – from benefits sharing to burden-
sharing – citizens want to have more say over future 
regional trajectories and exercise their democratic 
power. As a result, regionalism is evolving from a 
“closed process”, designed and packaged by a small 
circle of political and economic elites, to an open 
process in which democratic participation and 
accountability are playing an ever more important role.   
 
Many ASEAN member states are also undergoing major 
political transition with more politically active and 
demanding citizenry. Clearly the character of the state 
in the ASEAN region has been crucial in determining the 
narratives of ASEAN’s formation and development. The 
centrality of sovereignty, of nation-building, of top-
down authoritarian or of state-guided economic 
development impacted the way regional community 
building was conceived in its earlier days. The relative 
state weakness and imperatives of development, where 
the nation-state was seen as the solution, contrasted 
with post-1945 Europe in which the nation-state and 
nationalism are seen to be a problem to be overcome. 
 
The possibility of future change in ASEAN could 
therefore come from the changes in the character of 
the states in Southeast Asia. As the states transform 
themselves and move away from an authoritarian 
nature to a more democratic form, and as states gain 
legitimacy to become stronger, would regionalism in 
Southeast Asia take a different trajectory?  We have 
started to witness a shift from state-centric narratives 
of regionalism to a more people-centred narrative 
embodying discourses in democracy and human rights. 
This is due in part to the democratic transition of 
Indonesia and other member states, the general broad 
trends in the diffusion of power with more active 
engagement of civil society actors, and other 
transnational actors. 
 
Yet whether the active participation of civil society and 
non-state actors would necessarily lead to a 
transformation of the agenda of regionalism is not clear. 
Smith and Korzeniewicz, in their study of how 
transnational social movements may impact 
regionalism in Latin America, argued that transnational 
civil society actors still face severe constraints sharply 
limiting their capacity to wield influence, much less 
transform the pace and direction of regionalism. 
 
EU AND ASEAN – TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM? 
 
Is regionalism in Europe and Southeast Asia under 
stress? From the above discussions, one can see that 
domestic politics – arising in particular from demands 
from the citizenry and other non-state actors for more 
participation or more say in the regional project – and 
the rise of populist parties will interact and collide with 
the globalising forces of trade and transnational threats 
to drive the changes within EU and ASEAN. Increasingly 
in an EU that is in the midst of a financial and debt crisis, 
one hears the call not for less Europe or more Europe, 
but for a different kind of Europe. Within Southeast 
Asia, the increasing participation or “consultation” of 
civil society actors on the building of the socio-cultural 
pillar of the ASEAN Community also added another 
dimension to the ASEAN project. 
 
As debates heat up in both Europe and Southeast Asia 
on where the EU is heading, and how ASEAN is going to 
maintain its centrality in an increasingly complex and 
contested landscape in its neighbourhood, perhaps a 
fundamental question needs to be considered – can 
there or must there be some big idea or overall guiding 
narrative? Is there a moral political finality for the EU 
and ASEAN? Or should region-building in the EU and 
ASEAN be seen as a never-ending journey, with its twist 
and turns, road bumps and highways, on to which the 
destination is unknown?  
 
In its early years, the EU was infused with a certain 
moral political finality of an ever closer union with the 
implicit long term vision of a peaceful, united Europe. In 
contrast, ASEAN was more modestly crafted with no 
grand vision, except to keep communism and 
interference at bay and to maintain some form of 
balance of power in a volatile region. The idea was that 
member states would come together when necessary, 
whether against a common threat, or when the balance 
of power is threatened.  
 
The European approach has led to a certain linear, 
teleological thinking of deepening integration through 
functional and political spill-over. With the single 
market and increasing EU directives and legislations, 
and the idea of a European citizenship introduced first 
by the Maastricht Treaty, it is no wonder that there the 
idea of a post-national Europe began to surface with 
great enthusiasm in the 1990s. Yet the crisis revealed 
that the nation-state and national identities have not 
lost their importance relative to the supranational, and 
may be back with more salience together with the 
renationalisation of European politics.   
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Also, for a younger generation of Europeans raised in 
an era of peace and prosperity, the narrative of the EU 
as a peace project may not resonate as much as the 
economic benefits derived from EU membership. In fact, 
in a 2007 survey of young Europeans aged 15-30, when 
asked what the EU means to them personally, the 
freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU 
emerges as the most important considerations. A 
Standard Eurobarometer survey (2009) of all age 
groups also showed over 40 per cent stating freedom to 
travel, study and work anywhere as the meaning of the 
EU to them, and only 25 per cent think that the EU 
means peace.  However, when phrased in another way, 
peace among the member states is listed by more than 
50 per cent as the biggest achievement of the EU. The 
EU has delivered on peace, and now more people are 
expecting the EU to deliver on concrete benefits of jobs 
and opportunities at a time when the EU faces 
increasing economic pressures and divergences. As the 
EU struggles with the economic crisis, it has to fall back 
more and more on its political raison d’etre, reiterating 
its achievements on peace and reconciliation to hold 
the EU together. 
 
The dilemma for ASEAN is also one between economics 
and security, though it is played out quite differently. 
For the first 30 years ASEAN was about playing the 
balancing and hedging game and employing all antics to 
keep the region “stable”. A combination of external 
fears and challenges combined with internal quest for 
building trust and modernity kept ASEAN together. 
However, with the enlargement of ASEAN and in an 
increasingly complex situation fuelled by the end of the 
Cold War, the rise of China and the increasing 
competition between the US and China in the Asia-
Pacific, the external fears may have diverged and the 
challenges more complex to offer continued coherence 
and unity. What is the new imperative for ASEAN to 
stick together to make the journey to the unknown? 
 
Since 2003, ASEAN has made a pitch for a much more 
economic-oriented narrative. As the ASEAN economies 
reaped benefits from some of the structural reforms 
undertaken during the Asian financial crisis, and as the 
centre of economic activities shifted to the east riding 
on the rise of China and opening up of India, global 
economic competition propelled ASEAN towards 
greater economic integration within ASEAN. ASEAN’s 
full economic potential can only be unleashed with 
greater economic integration within ASEAN and further 
integration with the global economy. Also, with deeper 
integration and greater cohesion can ASEAN continue 
to be a driver of the various regional architectures in 
the Asia-Pacific. This comes at an important juncture 
when increasing competition for influence by the major 
powers in the increasingly important region inevitably 
lead to attempts to influence the agenda in the various 
regional architectures. The “default driver” seat that 
ASEAN hitherto enjoyed is no longer secured as other 
middle powers (Australia, South Korea) and major 
powers (US, China, Japan and Russia) took on a more 
active role. While these powers are not openly 
challenging the current role played by ASEAN in 
providing a platform for dialogue, increasingly there are 
efforts behind the scenes to influence different ASEAN 
member states in the agenda setting.  
 
Both the EU and ASEAN are therefore under both 
internal and external pressures to rethink its current 
trajectory of regionalism.   
 
The global, the systemic and external factors have 
always been central to the development of ASEAN. 
ASEAN is now at a critical juncture where it has to 
manage a worsening power-political scene in its 
external environment (with the tensions in the South 
China Sea/East China Sea, and increasing testiness in 
US-Sino relations) while at the same time trying to build 
internal coherence made more complex because of the 
greater political pluralism and social awareness that 
informed the people in ASEAN. Would the different 
forces drive ASEAN towards increasing its 
organisational capacity with more formal institutions 
and norms in order to manage the tensions and hang 
on to its centrality?    
 
ASEAN needs to move towards deeper integration if it 
wants to hang on to its centrality in the region, whereas 
opinion is still equally divided if the EU needs more 
centralisation or more flexibility. For those in the EU 
who thought that the post-national model of pooling 
and sharing sovereignty would mean less power politics 
and more policy choices, more institutional and legal 
wrangling but less power play, the recent financial and 
debt crises have brought forth the renationalisation of 
European politics. The trend towards the gradual 
strengthening of the supranational layers of the EU is 
coming to a standstill, as Europeans ponder over ever 
closer union, or a looser union. Nationalism, and with it 
the sovereign power, of the nation-state is back; 
perhaps not with a vengeance, but enough to make 
national politicians think twice about pushing for 
further integration and “ceding more sovereignty” to 
European institutions.    
 
EUC Working Paper No. 15 
 
11 
 
As the different constellations of forces – from the 
redistribution to the diffusion of power – lead us to a 
more turbulent and volatile world, the time has come 
for the EU and ASEAN to rethink their respective 
regional models, and adapt them to the new 
circumstances they are in. Could we perhaps expect 
ASEAN to become more institutionalised while the EU 
moves toward more flexibility and decentralisation?  
 
The ASEAN Way and its norm of non-interference have 
served ASEAN well when ASEAN was weak, and the 
room for manoeuvre was constrained particularly 
during the Cold War era. ASEAN needs to remain 
adaptive in a region where the security issues are 
increasingly complex, but at the same time, the 
“centrality” of ASEAN can no longer be assured by 
passive adaptation or mere reactive measures. ASEAN 
has to become more resourceful and more proactive in 
managing an increasingly important but incredibly 
diverse region of so many major players with very 
different interests. And ASEAN can only be “proactive” 
if it has a strong functioning core that can think 
strategically and act tactically. ASEAN is not about to 
wither away, but more of the same will only mean 
leaving the fates of its 600 million people at the mercy 
of others.  
  
As for the EU, from the original six to an entity of 28 
today, it has delivered on peace and reconciliation. 
Hence increasingly expectations have been on the EU 
to deliver on economic prosperity and higher and 
higher standards of living. It has also been rather 
successful in this until the advent of the global financial 
crisis and the debt crisis. The crisis revealed some 
shortcomings in the economic model supported by the 
EU, but more fundamentally, it revealed the tensions 
between existing political structures with the current 
socioeconomic model. 
 
The choice for the EU is not either more integration or 
less integration, but deeper integration where it 
matters, and decentralisation or localisation where 
necessary.  Recalling and operationalising the idea of 
proportionality and subsidiarity may be timely at this 
juncture. 
 
The EU and ASEAN, as the two most established 
regional organisations in their own unique way, may 
have taken divergent paths towards regional 
cooperation and integration. But both have reached a 
critical juncture and perhaps it is time to look even 
more closely towards each other to reflect and support 
each other in their respective journeys into an 
uncertain future.  
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